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1. Introduction
Understanding the impact of instability of export receipts on the economic growth of developing countries has been
an important area of research in development economics for a long time. A substantial body of literature has
documented a wide range of empirical regularities according to which export earnings instability (EEI) penalizes
LDCs’ economic performance. According to this view, EEI alters the path of economic progress by increasing the
uncertainty of financial resources needed to purchase capital goods1. This, in turn, reduces the overall level of
efficiency of a country because the formation of capital is distorted by bad investments planning (Commission of the
EC 1981, 1997)2.
At the same time, similar empirical results imply that there are a number of reasons why more attention to some
aspects of LDCs’ exports instability can be still useful. In fact, if the outcomes on EEI problem are utilized as a
ground for the adoption of stabilizing policies of LDCs’ export proceeds, then the question about the effectiveness of
these instruments remains unsolved. In addition, the evaluating exercise of the relevance of financial compensating
systems has further analytical value at the time when is in progress a liberalization process in commodity world
market, at the end of  which competition will be exacerbated and LDCs fear to be more and more marginalized.
The paper is organized as follows. After an investigation of the impact of EEI on LDCs’ economic growth, I briefly
present the nature of the policy via which the European Union has attempted to stabilize the export earnings of the
developing countries belonging to the Lomé Convention (henceforth ACPs) 3. I then describe the stabilizing effect of
EU’s  STABEX system and document its impact on the economic growth of the beneficiary countries. Finally, I will
present some prospects for the future of the scheme.
                                                                
1  For an overview of this literature, see, e.g., Maizels (1992), Love J. (1987) and Araujo-Bonjean et al. (1999).
2  A similar opinion  is expressed by World Bank in its 1983 report, FAO (1996, p. 25) and UNCTAD (1999) and it is much more
understandable when the economies are small and heavily dependent on agricultural commodity exports (Mac Bean 1966,
Lancieri 1978).
3  The ACPs are the following: Angola, Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso,
Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic,
Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Ivory Coast, Jamaica,
Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Papua New
Guinea, Rwanda, Saint Christopher and Nevis, Sao Tomè & Prince, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon, Somalia, St
Lucia, St Vincent, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad & Tobago, Tuvalu, Uganda, Vanuatu,
Western Samoa, Zaire, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
22. The effects of export earnings instability on LDCs’ economic growth.
The aim of this section is to evaluate whether export earnings instability exerts a causal impact on the economic
growth of LDCs. This is a core issue in the entire study, because if countries appear to be penalized by instability of
their exports, then the adoption of financial compensating systems can also be justified on an analytical grounds.
The following cross country regression represents the first step of the empirical analysis:
y X INSTi i i i= + + +a b q e [1]
where yi is the average annual growth rates of real per capita GDP
4 in the i-th country, Xi is a set of variables
which describes the growth in steady state,  INSTi is an index of exports instability, while 
e1  is the white noise
error term.
Estimations of equ. [1] show evidence of the impact of EEI on the global economic growth, even if no information is
given on the way this link occurs. In order to provide an indirect answer to this question, it could be useful to
determine the impact of EEI on one of the key variables for economic growth: the total factor productivity. In this
part of the work, I refer to the vast recent literature on growth which clearly shows that cross-country differences
in the levels and growth rates of per capita income are not due to the accumulation of inputs, but are  mostly
determined by the differences in the level and growth of  total factor productivity (TFP)5.
So, if the objective were to capture the impact of EEI on the investments opportunity of a country, I should also
consider a variant of equ. [1], where the dependent variable is the growth rate of TFP. The TFP has been
calculated by adopting the approach followed in many other papers (Hall and Jones, 1998 and 1999; McGrattan and
Schmitz 1998, Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare, 1997). In particular, I start by assuming that the neoclassical
aggregate production function has the same form across countries, is a Cobb-Douglas with constant returns to scale
and is augmented to include human capital as well, as in Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992):
( ) ( )Y K A L hi i i i i= -a a1 [2]
The level of output for country i (Yi) is determined by the stock of physical capital (Ki), by a measure of technology
Ai (or «labor augmenting measure of productivity»), by the number of labor units employed (Li) multiplied by the
individual amount of human capital available (hi). It is assumed that technical progress is labor augmenting. The
determination of human capital is based on a earnings function estimated by Mincer (1974), h ei
Si= g , where Si
denotes the average years of schooling and g is the rate of return for each year of schooling6.
The output function [2] can be expressed in terms of output per worker, dividing both members by Li:
                                                                
4  For each country the growth rate of real per capita GDP (y) has been calculated by running a linear (y=a+bT+e) and a log
linear [ln(y)=a+bT + e] trend function. The choice is in favor of the model which better fitted data and the estimated
coefficient b* is the measure of the annual growth rate of y. The other growth rates used throughout the paper have been
computed in the same way.
5  See, i.e., Hall and Jones (1999), Easterly and Levine (1999), Harrigan (1999), King and Levine (1994).
6  The function of human capital is in the form hi=e
f (Si), where f(Si) represents the efficiency of labor with Si years of education
respect to one without education, f(S)=0, and f’(Si) is the rate of return of schooling. Our function f(Si)=gSi is piecewise linear
as, among others, in Hall and Jones (1999) , Beck, Levine and Loayza (1999). A peculiarity of this functional form, which is
very useful for calculation, is that  f (Si)=Si f’(Si).
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Now, I take logs of [3] and time derivatives to get the growth rate of Total Factor Productivity, 
&Ai :
[ ]& & & ( ) & ( )A y k Si i i i= - - - - -a g a a1 1 1 [4]
where &yi ,
&k i  and
&Si are the growth rates of the output per worker, of the physical capital-worker ratio and of the
average years of education, respectively. I assume a capital share a=0.3 and g=13.4 for the first 4 years of
schooling and 10.1% for periods of education ranging from 4 to 8 years.7.
Following much empirical literature on growth accounting (Barro and Sala i Martin 1995; Hall and Jones, 1998,
1999; Beck, Levine and Loayza, 1999), I use the perpetual inventory method for calculating the time series of the
stock of physical capital needed to apply eq. [4]. The measure of capital stock is based on the dynamic relation
( )K K It t t+ = - +1 1 d [5]
where Kt is the stock of physical capital at time t, d is the depreciation rate and It represents the gross investment
incurred during period t. The depreciation rate is assumed to be of 6%, as in Hall and Jones (1999). If d and It are
known, then the application of [5] will require an estimation for capital in the first year (K0 ). In this growth
accounting exercise K0 is given by the formula K0=I0/(n+g+d), where n is the growth rate of the labor force and g
is the rate of technical progress, which can be approximated to the growth rate labor output (Mankiw, Romer and
Weil 1992). 1975 is the first year to be considered.
As regards the conditioning variables on the structural differences across countries inserted in regressions, the
choice has been made to control for convergence (the logarithm of the initial per capita income), to capture the
differences in human capital stock (initial level of education), in macroeconomic stability (government size), in the
degree of openness (exports plus imports as percentage of GDP), in external conditions (growth of terms of trade),
in public distortions to market (black market premium), in the share of private investment to GDP and, lastly, to take
into account the differences in the instability of export earnings.
In order to deal with the problems of endogeneity and reverse causation, estimations were made with  the method of
instrumental variables, where lagged variables enter as instruments for the ratios “exports plus import to GDP”
“investments to GDP” and “budget deficit to GDP” and for the log of (1+black market premium). Lagged variables
are the average values over the five years (1970-74) preceding the starting period of the analysis. The indicator of
differences in human capital availability, expressed as the initial secondary school enrolment rate, and the growth of
terms of trade, expressed by the ratio of price index of exports over the price index of imports, enter in the
regression as their own instruments, because of their exogeneity. Finally, the index of exports instability used in the
growth equations is the coefficient of variation adjusted by the factor 1
2- R , where R 2  is the corrected
coefficient of determination of the deterministic trend function (linear, log-linear)8 that best fits the actual export
                                                                
7  These average values of g are those obtained by Psacharopoulos (1994) for the sub-Saharan countries  and for the world as a
whole, respectively. They are also used in Hall and Jones (1999), McGrattan and Schmitz (1998) and Beck, Levine and Loayza
(1999). In my computations, these two different rates split the ACPs category into two sub-groups: the Africans countries, to
which the rate 13.4% has been used, and the Caribbean and Pacific countries to which the world average rate (10.1%) has
been  applied.
8  Because of the high correlation over the period 1975-1998  (0,94 for ACPs and 0,91 for LDCs other than ACPs) between the
value of the presented index of instability (see values in table 5) and the one determined using a mixed deterministic-
stochastic trend function [ln(y)=a+bT + dy-1 +  e], I prefer to use the deterministic relation since it allows us make comparisons
with other studies (i.e. Aiello 1999a, 1999b; and Herrmann, Burger and Smit 1993). Comparable results about the relationship
4revenues (Cuddy and Della Valle 1978)9. The index of instability enters in regressions as its own instrument,
because I refer to small exporting developing countries which are price-takers and whose exports instability mostly
derives, as a consequence, from exogenous factors, such as the instability of export prices, the changes in foreign
demand and the variability caused by unforeseen domestic events (i.e., change in climate).
It is worth to notice that the specification of the model, besides usual conditioning variables present in growth
equations à la Barro, contains all the components of vulnerability, expressed as the risk of being harmed by
unforeseen external shocks. In fact, as Guillaumont (1999b) has sharply presented in a recent paper, the economic
vulnerability of a small and exports depending country is determined by the exposure to the shocks (proxied in our
model by the indicator of openness), by the size of the shocks (our index of exports instability) and by the policies
adopted to minimize the impact of the shocks, which in this study consist in the financial stabilization scheme
inserted in the Lomé Convention (cfr. infra)
From the point of view of the expectations about the signs of the coefficients, the estimation of q  is the central
objective of the investigation.  If we refer to the literature on this subject, q  may be either positive or negative.
However, given the sample of countries examined and the criticism to the optimistic view on EEI, one would expect
q  to be negative. Indeed, papers which claim that EEI is positively linked to the economic growth of a country have
been the object of so much methodological debate which casts doubts on the validity of the interpretation of their
results10. This is why many authors and international institutions nowadays argue that export earnings stability is a
prerequisite for economic growth. Moreover, bearing on mind that the sample under investigation made up of
beneficiaries of compensatory financing schemes, it is likely that these states are penalized by the instability of their
exports. Furthermore, this is expected to be especially verified for ACPs, because if we control for aid tied to EEI,
then the ACP group is much more homogeneous than the sample of other LDCs (cfr. infra)
Regression results are presented in tables 1 and 2, where in each data presentation, columns 1 and 2 show estimates
obtained for a sample of 108 developing countries, while columns 3-4 and 5-6 report the findings of regression run
separately for the group of 60 ACPs and for the group of 48 LDCs other than ACPs, respectively. I consider a
base model and a variant of it that includes the variables related to trade (the growth of exports, the degree of
openness, the growth of terms of trade and the index of EEI). This is to test if and to what extent the growth of
developing economies has been dependent on trade over the period examined.
Like in many other papers, I find a conditional convergence process for the entire group of LDCs, even if the
convergence coefficient differs sharply across the two selected groups of countries. Indeed, what emerges clearly
from estimations is that, after controlling for the impact of the structural determinants of the steady state of each
country, ACPs growth faster than the other LDCs: in the complete variant of the growth equations (columns 4 and
6 in table 1), the coefficient on the logarithm of initial per capita income is –0.0181 for ACPs and –0.012 for LDCs
non ACPs. These outcomes imply, ceteris paribus, that within ACP group convergence occurs at the rate of  2.22
percent per year, whereas in the group of other LDCs the convergence rate is 1.37 percent per annum11.
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
between different trend functions are also in  Guillaumont (1999). Finally, Augmented Dickey-Fuller, Phillips-Perron tests
reject non-stationary hypothesis for the weighted average export earnings time series of ACPs and other LDCs, where
weights are the shares of each country with respect to the total export of the group.
9 The computation of the index of instability differs from the previous applications (Cuddy  and Della Valle, 1978; Herrmann,
Burger and Smit, 1993; Di Costanzo, 1993, Herrmann and Weiss, 1995) because I accept the validity of the comment by
Duggan (1979) on Cuddy –Della Valle's article, in which the author points out how the autocorrelation of the errors modifies
the values of the index Ix. To eliminate the effects on the least-squares estimators of autocorrelation, I use the Cochrane-
Orcutt iterative process and assume that the disturbance term follows an AR(1) scheme.
10 See, i.e., Lam (1980), Savvides (1984), Mac Bean and Nguyen (1987), Lim (1991) and Gyimah-Brempong (1991).
11For comparison , growth regressions by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) indicate that countries converged at the rate of 3% per
year over 1965-1985. Other papers (Beck, Levine and Loayza 1999, Lensink, Bo and Sterken 1999, Guillaumont, Guillaumont
and Varoudakis, 1999; Bosworth, Collins and Chen, 1995) provide more recent empirical evidence which confirm that countries
experience conditional convergence paths. Finally, Gylfason, (1997) finds analogous outcomes to mine when he runs separate
5As for the signs and significance of the other conditioning variables, the regressions show, the positive effect on
growth of human capital availability and investments and the  negative impact of public deficit size and of market
distortions proxied by the black market premium.
Interestingly, the coefficient of the initial openness indicator, the ratio exports plus imports to GDP, is always
significant and shows how LDCs growth over 1975-1998 has been strongly and positively influenced by the  degree
of openness recorded in  mid-seventies. Then, it emerges, as in Proudman et al (1997), that countries  with more
openness converge faster towards their steady state equilibrium and, how data in tables 1 and 2 show, between the
two groups of countries there is a difference, because of the higher significance and size of the concerned
coefficient in the ACP regressions. Furthermore, all estimations confirm the positive effect on growth exercised by
the improvement of the terms of trade.
As for the main purpose of this section, tables 1 and 2 reveal that the coefficient associated with the  index of
instability is negative and statistically significant. This suggests that EEI exerts a remarkable and negative impact on
the growth of real per capita GDP and on growth productivity, that is to say the more unstable the export earnings
of LDC, the lower their economic and TFP growth12. Estimations differentiate between developing countries
belonging or not to the Lomé Convention. In fact,  if we refer to the growth of per capita GDP (table 1), the
estimated coefficient of INSTA will be negative and always significant at the 5% level in the regressions of ACPs,
whereas it records a degree of significance at the level of 10% when regressions refer to other LDCs. The
magnitude of the impact is also different, since the parameter d in ACPs’ estimations is always greater, in absolute
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
regressions for the low income countries, such as the majority of ACPs, and for the groups of medium and high income
countries.
12These results are coherent with the ones obtained, among others, in Aiello (1999b) where, under the framework of a
neoclassical production function in line with the tradition of Feder (1983), all the estimations obtained by regressing the
growth rate of  GDP net of exports on the growth rates of gross fixed capital formation, of employment and of exports and on
two indices of EEI, provide a robust negative impact of exports instability on ACP economic growth over 1975-1995. On the
other hand, and consistently with all other cross-country based papers, these outcomes are not undermined by the ones
recently obtained by Sinha (1999), who applying modern time series econometrics techniques on nine Asian countries,
concludes that EEI is negatively linked to growth in five out of nine economies, while for the remaining cases the relationship
is even positive. Indeed, it seems that final regression reported in that paper does not allow researchers to draw general
conclusion, because of the low level of statistical significance observed in the growth equations for the coefficient of the
index of instability (logarithm of the absolute value of the deviations of exports from its five-years moving average).
6terms, than the one of  LDCs13. Analogous conclusions can be drawn when one compares the two groups of
countries considering regressions on growth productivity. A further and original result is obtainable when
comparisons are made within the same sample of countries looking to global economic and productivity growth
regressions. Evidence shows that, whatever the model and the sample of country, the negative impact of  EEI is
more significant and stronger in productivity equations. This appears to be a clear indication that variability
registered in export receipts by
developing countries impedes their growth by lowering the level of efficiency with which inputs are employed.
To sum up, from my perspective, the main conclusion from this econometric evaluation favors policies which
guarantee the stabilization of world export markets because, if such policies operates and are effective, the stability
improves the growth of total factor productivity and exerts, as a consequence, positive effects on the global growth
of the concerned developing countries.
                                                                
13These results can be explained by the higher exports instability and the more substantial dependence on exports in ACPs
than in other LDCs.  Indeed during the period examined, the index of national export receipts is 35.14 for ACPs (see table 5)
and 17.8 for other 40 developing countries.  Similar results emerge when different aggregation of products (STABEX eligible
products, agricultural products) are considered (CERDI et al., 1998).
Table 1 Economic growth and LDCs’ export earnings instability (1975-1998).
Variables
      ALL
SAMPLE
Base model
Augmented
Model
ACPs
Base Model
Augmented
     Model
Base Model
Other LDCs
   Augmented
Model
Constant 9.21
(3.31)
8.34
(3.87)
12.5
(2.76)
11.7
(2.54)
9.81
(3.01)
8.31
(2.78)
Log (Initial per capita income) -0.011
(-3.24)
-0.014
(-2.78)
-0,017
(-2,56)
-0.0181
(-2.41)
-0.011
(-3.13)
-0.012
(-2.87)
Schooling 0.044 0.045 0.023 0.021 0.034 0.0294
(3.01) (2.87) (2.67) (2.45) (2.48) (2.34)
Investments to GDP 0.043
(1.58)
0.037
(1.571)
0.025
(1.45)
0.023
(1.47)
0.041
(1.66)
0.043
(1.76)
Budget Deficit/GDP -1.34
(1.76)
-1.21
(1.65)
-1.33
(1.83)
-1.3
(1.78)
-1.25
(1.47)
-1.12
(1.54)
Log (1+Black Market Premium) -0.17
(1.97)
-0.16
(1.95)
-0.2
(2.15)
-0.21
(2.02)
-0.15
(1.87)
-0.16
(1.63)
[(Exports + Imports)/GDP] 0.76
(1.95)
0.65
(2.12)
0.71
(2.08)
Term of Trade 0.14
(2.65)
0.132
(2.23)
0.145
(2.54)
Index of EEI -0.28
(2.22)
-0.34
(2.32)
-0.15
(1.78)
R2 adj. 0.42 0.46 0.38 0.41 0.46 0.46
Obs. 108 108 60 60 48 48
LM test 2.21 2.78 2.35 2.82 1.89 1.89
Source: own computation on data from World Bank (World Development Indicators 1999), Penn-World Tables 5.6 and FAO.
8t-values are corrected for heteroscedasticity by White’s (1980) method.
Table 2   TFT growth and LDCs’ export earnings instability (1975-1998).
Variables
      ALL
SAMPLE
Base model
Augmented
Model
ACPs
Base Model
Augmented
     Model
Base Model
Other LDCs
   Augmented
Model
Constant 15.3
(2.76)
14.34
(2.79)
21..5
(2.21)
23.9
(2.14)
19.2
(2.41)
18.72
(2.34)
Log (Initial per capita income) -0.009
(-2.45)
-0.01
(-2.13)
-0,012
(-2,12)
-0.0131
(-1.96)
-0.0098
(-2.74)
-0.011
(-2.7)
Schooling 0.02 0.025 0.009 0.012 0.021 0.02
(1.67) (1.65) (1.91) (2.05) (2.12) (2.14)
Investments to GDP 0.033
(1.69)
0.029
(1.78)
0.02
(1.49)
0.019
(1.21)
0.034
(1.76)
0.038
(1.82)
Budget Deficit/GDP -1.1
(1.86)
-1.18
(1.75)
-1.01
(2.03)
-0.98
(1.96)
-1.14
(1.77)
-1.09
(1.94)
Log (1+Black Market Premium) -0.156
(1.95)
-0.14
(1.9)
-0.195
(2.03)
-0.18
(1.98)
-0.145
(1.91)
-0.14
(1.71)
[(Exports + Imports)/GDP] 0.36
(1.35)
0.53
(1.93)
0.61
(2.13)
Term of Trade 0.12
(2.1)
0.101
(1.98)
0.11
(2.04)
Index of EEI -0.31
(2.54)
-0.41
(2.38)
-0.22
(1.91)
R2 adj. 0.32 0.37 0.32 0.36 0.39 0.41
Obs. 108 108 60 60 48 48
9LM test 2.91 2.78 3.11 3.01 1.95 2.01
Source: see table 1.
3 Basic rules of STABEX and reasons for stabilizing ACPs’ export earnings.
The previous section provides strong empirical evidence to sustain the position of low income countries, which fear
of the degree of economic vulnerability and are claiming more attention and protection from this concern. Indeed, I
have showed that export instability seriously damages the growth of  a small economy and this result necessarily
enters as one of the factors defining the vulnerability of a country with respect to structural shocks14. The negative
relationship between EEI and economic growth appeared to be  more significant for the group of ACPs which are
being heavily dependent on few primary commodity exports much more vulnerable than other LDCs. In the same
way, these arguments support the choices made by the European Union, when it decided to adopt a policy
specifically aimed at stabilizing  the export earning instability of the developing countries belonging to the Lomé
Convention. The established scheme is the STABEX (French acronym for STAbilisation des recettes
d’Exportation), which is the bulk of the development policy pursued by the EU and is aimed at improving the degree
of resilience to external shocks of ACP economies.
STABEX has operated since 1975 as one of the policies (preferential treatments, export quota, supply controls,
production diversification, etc) adopted by the EU for sustaining the export growth of the 70 ACPs. In detail, it aims
to assist ACP commodity exporting countries when they experience a fall in export proceeds in selected agricultural
sectors. The basic idea behind this compensatory facility is to settle payments in favor to ACP governments in order
to compensate the shortfalls incurred in their exports and therefore re-establish the earnings which would have been
received under normal market conditions. In addition, transfers are settled without taking into account the causes of
exports instability. This means that prices and volumes are the ones freely determined by world market forces and
no attention is given to understanding to what extent EEI is due to the variability of commodity export prices, or to
the changes in the quantity traded. The main matter is the stabilization of export proceeds because in a scenario of
strong dependence on international market, stable intakes of foreign currencies are crucial in determining the
balance of payments, the level of external debt, the solidity of public budget and the effectiveness of investment
internally planned in LDCs. In other words, STABEX is an instrument for minimizing ex-post the financial risk for
ACPs deriving from losses in commodity exports.
Table 3 STABEX: operations and  objectives
Main
Objective
To remedy the harmful effects of exports instability and to safeguard the purchasing power
of ACP states which suffer badly from drops in export proceeds. (Art. 186.1)
Transfers are paid for stabilize the exports of 49 selected commodities.
Art.187, Antonelli 1995, Grillli 1993,  Hermmann et al. 1993
Trade flows As a rule, compensation can be claimed for exports from each ACP to EU. (Art. 189.3).
When most (60-70%) of ACP’s export revenues do not come from trade with UE the subject
of stabilisation can be also the exports to world market. Compensation is also possible for
intra-ACP trade. (Art. 189.2)
Qualifying
criteria
The scheme is activated if:
a) the exports of an eligible product represent at least 5.5% of total exports from an ACP to
all destination (dependence threshold). Actually the full dependence threshold is applied
only for 12 ACPs, because the others are all considered to be least-developed and/or
landlocked and/or islands. (Art. 196, 330, 333, 336).
b) the exports to the EU market (or to all destinations,  in specific cases) of any STABEX-
product are at least 6% below the reference level (fluctuation threshold). The reference
level is equal to the average export earnings of the six calendar years prior to the one of
application, excluding the two years with the highest and lowest figures (Art. 197.2).
c) instability does not depend on the operating of commercial policies which discriminate
against EU.
                                                                
14 This is coherent with the conclusions drawn by the Committee of Development Policy of UN, when it proposes to determine
an Economic Vulnerability Indicator (EVI) as a weighted average of instability and concentration of exports, changes in
agricultural output, population size and of the share of manufacturing to GDP. A longer discussion and many other details
regarding conceptual clarifications and methods to calculate an international comparable indicator of economic vulnerability
are in Guillaumont (1999) and Committee of Development Policy (1999).
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The main provision of STABEX indicates that it is aimed at reducing the instability and risks faced by the
commodity-export-dependent ACP states only when the shortfall of proceeds is substantial and generally regards
the exports to EU market of eligible products15. Exceptions allow compensation claims considering the flow trade of
an individual commodity to all destination (Table 3).
When it was implemented, STABEX was considered innovative because of its micro-based rules16. The main
specificity of the scheme was to be targeted on selected agricultural products, which are relevant to the export
structure of each ACP. The commodity-by-commodity approach holds in successive conventions and it is given,
among other things, by the fact that transfers are gross in the sense that they are calculated considering only what
happens in the sector concerned. This means that the scheme does not permit compensations for reductions and
increases of receipts from exports which can be recorded at the level of a single country in different sectors.
However, if, on one hand, it is unquestionable that the first instrumental goal of STABEX is to stabilize the exports
time series of triggering sectors (EU 1997, Aiello 1999a), on the other hand one has also to remember that this mere
statistical effect is not sufficient to establish a sounder economic structure in each ACP economy. The final result
depends upon how far the stabilization of export earnings is transmitted to stabilization of farmers income. The latter
is the real ultimate objective of STABEX which has both a short and medium-long run valence and requires that
payments must be transferred quickly  at level of sector in order to refund farmers and, when required, to be strictly
utilized for removing domestic cause of instability. These arguments help to understand how an international
financing scheme apparently addressed only to cope with unstable exports of single commodities can have an
impact on macro-variables, such as national exports and economic growth of a country. The implicit rationale of
STABEX is based on the following virtuous circle: when EU-ACPs channel funds towards commodities whose
exports are unstable but important for the concerned country and these financial resources are used in the sector
which suffers the shortfall of revenue, then STABEX contributes to reduce the total EEI and, ceteris paribus, to
raise the national economic growth in the long run.
If the mechanics, main objectives and spirit of STABEX have remained fundamentally the same over time (see
table 3), Lomè IV introduces certain innovations that emphasize the sectoral perspective of the program. By
establishing that transfers must be utilized in the triggering sectors and paid directly to the farmers, one of these new
rules (art. 186§2 of Lomé IV) tries to stabilize mostly economic agents income, whereas previous conventions
generally stated that compensation should maintain high the financial flows in favor to the sector. In order to achieve
this objective, the use of funds must be monitored and this is why that payment allocations reflect the conditions
fixed in a framework of mutual obligations (FMO), which is negotiated by EU Commission and each ACP state17.
The FMO was the means the EU used to redirect, at the beginning of nineties, its orientation in STABEX, stipulating
further controls and restrictions on the possible uses of transfers18.
                                                                
15 STABEX covers the following products: cocoa beans, cocoa husks, shells and skins and other waste, cocoa paste, cocoa
butter, cocoa powder, raw or roasted coffee, extracts, essences and concentrates of coffee, groundnuts in shell or shelled,
groundnuts oil, cotton not carded or combed, cotton linters, coconuts, copra, coconut oil, palm oil, palm kernel oil, palm nuts
and kernels, leather of bovine animals, sheep and lamb skin leather, goat and kid skin leather, wood in the rough and squared
wood, sawn wood, fresh bananas, dried bananas, tea, vanilla, cloves, wool not carded or combed, fine animal hair of angora
goat mohair, gum arabic, pyrethrum, saps and extracts of pyrethrum, essential oils, sesame seed, cashew nuts and kernels,
pepper, shrimps and prawns, squid, octopus and cuttlefish, cotton seed, oil cake, rubber, peas, beans, lentils, nutmeg and
mace, sheanuts, shea nut oil and mangoes (art. 187.1 of Lomé IV).
16 Since 1963 the International Monetary Fund established the Compensatory Financial Facility aimed at providing support to
countries whose balance of payments suffers from drops of export earnings. Different from STABEX, the IMF-CFF  deals with
instability of national exports and not with drops of single commodity export  proceeds. An overall discussion and evaluation
of IMF-CFF is, among others, in Lim (1991) and Herrmann, Burger and Smit (1993).
17 For further details of the scheme see EC Commission (1984; 1997).
18 Before Lomé IV, the EU Commission has always allowed ACPs to decide freely how to allocate STABEX funds, even if the
exercise of this discretional power has had to be in conformity with the regulations layed down under the Convention. These
regulations stipulated that STABEX transfers be invested preferably in the sector concerned, or more generally in other
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4 The effectiveness of STABEX.
A brief overview of STABEX payments made during the period 1975-1998 is presented in tables 4 and 5. These
transfers were 4.354 Millions ECUs and they were received by 52 out of 70 ACPs. Their distribution was
concentrated both in terms of country and product. Almost 68% of the total transfer was in fact obtained by 10
beneficiary countries (Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Senegal, Ethiopia, Sudan Papua New Guinea, Kenya, Uganda,
Ghana, Rwanda). The first five alone received more than 53% of the total. At the opposite end, there are 30 ACPs
which individually received less than 1% of the total STABEX payments and which together account  for less than
11% (table 4).  Data in table 5 shows that the distribution of STABEX compensations by product has been even
more concentrated: between 1975 and 1998 only two products (cacao and coffee) obtained more that 54% of total
STABEX funds. This share rises to more than 80% when groundnut, cotton, and wood are added, whilst with copra,
sisal and palm products is almost 90%.
The high degree of concentration of STABEX funds is stressed, when  the compensations of the  major products in
each of the 10 major beneficiary countries are considered. It is possible to show that transfers are generated by the
export earnings performance of a limited number of product (coffee, cocoa, groundnut, cotton, copra) exported by
only 10 of the 70 ACPs. For instance, transfers settled for coffee in 7 ACPs (Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Ethiopia,
Papua New Guinea, Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda) are more than 85% of the total compensation obtained for
coffee over 1975-1998. Furthermore, Cameroon and Ghana’s cocoa exports receive about 68% of the total
payments transferred to the cocoa sector (by adding Ivory Coast’s cocoa exports this percentage is more than 81%.
Papua New Guinea’s palm product exports receive most (76%) of the total transfers provided to the palm sector
and more than 84% of the compensations received by the wood sector were allocated to the Ivory Coast wood
exports.
As mentioned before (section 3), Stabex was established to foster the economic growth of ACPs by reducing the
instability of their export earnings. So, it is worth to assessing the effectiveness of the scheme firstly  by evaluating
Stabex stabilizing effect on ACPs’ export receipts time series and then by capturing the relationship between this
effect and the economic growth of the beneficiary countries. In order to evaluate the stabilizing effect of the
scheme, I consider the Cuddy Della Valle’s index used in regressions of real GDP per capita and productivity
growth (tables 1 and 2), by using the expression Xt,s= Xt+STt-1, in which it is assumed that the payments were made
one year after the year of application. Therefore, at time t the export receipts with STABEX (Xt,s) sums the actual
export values (Xt) and the compensation related to the export earnings in year t-1 that the EU Commission settled at
time t19. Following this approach, STABEX is effective when the index of instability referred to the time series
“exports plus transfers” is less than the value of the index computed only on the export earnings.
Table 6 offers  details of the Stabex impact over the period 1975-1998. During the examined period of time, the
instability of ACP export earnings amounts to 35.14, a value that is higher than the one (26.40) calculated for the
period 1975-1987 involving 48 ACPs (Herrmann, Burger and Smit, 1993) and the one (33.53) of 51 ACPs registered
over 1973-1993 (Aiello, 1999a). These comparisons allow us to discern how the EEI of ACPs has grown over time,
and, as a consequence, one would expect an equal increase in the effectiveness of EU’s Stabex program. On the
contrary, STABEX stabilizing effect on the instability of ACPs’ export earnings is very low and accounts only for
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
sectors of the country where this could be justified on the grounds of diversification. In particular, from 1975 to 1985, the
years of application of the first and second Lomé Convention, the final use of funds was not subject to any stringent
controls. In Lomé I, ACPs on request from the Commission had to communicate the final destination of the allocated funds.
Other than this, during Lomè II ACPs were expected to inform the Commission on their most likely use and destination before
obtaining the transfers. In Lomé III ACPs had to provide the Commission with «substantial» indications on projects financed
by STABEX funds giving the motivations for diverting the funds from their original destination into a different sector.
19The rationale behind this assumption is based on the fact that the EU Commission must take a decision concerning all
transfers by 31 July of the year following the year of application (art. 207 of Lomé IV). In addition, both in 1975-1979 and 1988-
1992 the Commission paid compensation within 9-10 months after the year of application (Di Costanzo 1993; Lim, 1991).
Longer delays occurred during nineties the reasons of which are briefly discussed into section 5.
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Table 4 Stabex transfers. Breakdown by country (1975-1998)
Lomè I Lomè II Lomè III Lomè IV Absolute cum.
Countries (1975-79) (1980-84) (1985-89) (1990-98) Values % %
1 Ivory Coast 15000000 93417020 365260445 248560279 722237744 16,59 16,59
2 Cameroon 4064981 29590291 198764270 241126952 473546494 10,88 27,46
3 Senegal 65106389 90583330 106953091 58380260 321023070 7,37 34,84
4 Ethiopia 14420049 11299624 98605603 187474474 311799750 7,16 42,00
5 Sudan 41776364 40695259 63929391 135938271 282339285 6,48 48,48
6 Papua New Guinea 0 50690742 110005548 79070800 239767090 5,51 53,99
7 Kenya 0 44865565 70896331 79071767 194833663 4,47 58,46
8 Uganda 20595453 0 0 140398404 160993857 3,70 62,16
9 Ghana 5176408 85470931 0 43941587 134588926 3,09 65,25
10 Rwanda 608802 9330694 61905411 48108777 119953684 2,76 68,01
11 Burundi 1485655 13811299 44496384 57835114 117628452 2,70 70,71
12 Tanzania 20701549 20864338 8908060 59454399 109928346 2,52 73,23
13 Togo 3626614 28834025 25546506 31289106 89296251 2,05 75,29
14 Madagascar 5747547 9988785 4506173 68726731 88969236 2,04 77,33
15 Solomon Isl. 2173387 4335074 31268105 50030448 87807014 2,02 79,35
16 Central African Rep. 7829555 5196750 31223639 22303524 66553468 1,53 80,87
17 Chad 7336196 6640136 40388374 10969958 65334664 1,50 82,37
18 St Lucia 0 1618999 0 60747143 62366142 1,43 83,81
19 St Vincent & Gren. 0 913286 0 59476297 60389583 1,39 85,19
20 Dominica 2892944 3534837 1208418 38327037 45963236 1,06 86,25
21 Malawi 0 4934458 21704751 18927658 45566867 1,05 87,30
22 Benin 20366720 4645443 17717889 1478805 44208857 1,02 88,31
23 Gambia 7514754 18154311 13715509 3720108 43104682 0,99 89,30
24 Mali 9780903 10701239 20272966 941986 41697094 0,96 90,26
25 Zimbabwe 0 0 0 37715634 37715634 0,87 91,13
26 Burkina Faso 7261902 1046734 7317540 19096173 34722349 0,80 91,92
28 Vanuatu 1430863 8931767 19291375 3743527 33397532 0,77 92,69
29 Niger 22653960 0 6610427 0 29264387 0,67 93,36
30 Comoros 2326446 6574673 9563715 9105437 27570271 0,63 94,00
31 Sierra Leone 0 14351129 0 11880301 26231430 0,60 94,60
32 Western Somoa 2837453 6488960 11122242 5772509 26221164 0,60 95,20
33 Mozambique 0 0 21451157 3549775 25000932 0,57 95,77
27 Haiti 11063418 11325464 22388882 0,51 96,29
34 Grenada 0 3963333 2530362 12976628 19470323 0,45 96,74
35 Guinea Bissau 11288257 3649211 2881708 1362164 19181340 0,44 97,18
36 Equatorial Guinea 0 0 9830661 8272188 18102849 0,42 97,59
37 Mauritania 0 0 0 15510857 15510857 0,36 97,95
38 Sao Tomè & Prince 0 7603763 1626901 2849620 12080284 0,28 98,23
39 Tonga 1207990 4011141 4332023 2388599 11939753 0,27 98,50
40 Gabon 6703311 0 3127959 0 9831270 0,23 98,73
41 Leshoto 0 1290959 4364313 3251332 8906604 0,20 98,93
42 Swaziland 0 8189318 0 0 8189318 0,19 99,12
43 Congo 7361677 0 0 0 7361677 0,17 99,29
44 Kiribati 2283419 1598972 2458565 906909 7247865 0,17 99,45
45 Somalia 1932145 3580556 543312 0 6056013 0,14 99,59
46 Fiji 2114974 3000921 263918 0 5379813 0,12 99,72
47 Jamaica 0 4295408 0 0 4295408 0,10 99,81
48 Cape Verde 1206564 526961 0 1847583 3581108 0,08 99,90
49 Mauritius Isl. 0 0 2950299 0 2950299 0,07 99,96
50 Djibouti 691851 0 0 0 691851 0,02 99,98
51 Tuvalu 174729 141635 139081 37421 492866 0,01 99,99
52 Belize 342364 0 0 0 342364 0,01 100,00
Total 328022175 669361877 1458745840 1897892006 4354021898 100
Source: "Report on the operation of STABEX", Commision of the European Communities, Brussels, various issues.
Amounts in ECU Total (1975-1998)
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Table 5  STABEX transfers. Breakdown by product (1975-1998).
     Amount in Euro     Total  (1975-1998)
Products Lomè I Lomè II Lomè III Lomè IV Absolute % %
(1975-79) (1980-84) (1985-89) (1990-98) values cum.
1 Coffe 14494289 246582657 589494410 935726396 1786297752 41,03 41,03
2 Cocoa 1521161 148836782 203098818 249204248 602661009 13,84 54,87
3 Groundnut 139360279 133258043 168023123 63943644 504585089 11,59 66,46
4 Cotton 43359441 36534333 84649754 153806608 318350136 7,31 73,77
5 Wood/Timber 39992067 390631 106806372 126529514 273718584 6,29 80,06
6 Copra 10571240 31625346 101336328 20586158 164119072 3,77 83,82
7 Sisal 20577410 9068448 3472194 123073409 156191461 3,59 87,41
8 Palm (oil, kernel oil, nuts and kernels of) 7800126 3913661 77727124 17979797 107420708 2,47 89,88
9 Oil cake 17594585 16789736 20848292 41012815 96245428 2,21 92,09
10 Bananas 5813366 14220660 1697755 53493056 75224837 1,73 93,82
11 Tea 8376330 2250103 45905104 9220708 65752245 1,51 95,33
12 Gum arabic 848489 0 0 44208100 45056589 1,03 96,36
13 Vanilla 2903720 5159394 2540479 14696929 25300522 0,58 96,94
14 Beans 0 4996671 19604719 100787 24702177 0,57 97,51
15 Cloves 2303517 851095 11639394 4877982 19671988 0,45 97,96
16 Shrimps, prawns and squid 0 710289 388231 15980076 17078596 0,39 98,35
17 Cashew nuts 0 4903831 7619419 1788782 14312032 0,33 98,68
18 Raw hides and skins 9093834 913011 2471441 1399443 13877729 0,32 99,00
19 Sesame seed 2632923 3150900 955047 4759175 11498045 0,26 99,27
20 Karitè 0 1937603 5821886 3251332 11010821 0,25 99,52
21 Nutmeg and mace 0 637851 0 6632211 7270062 0,17 99,69
22 Wool, mohair 0 1290959 4364313 994638 6649910 0,15 99,84
23 Essential Oils 170596 1339873 0 2483909 3994378 0,09 99,93
24 Pyrethrum 608802 0 281637 1837893 2728332 0,06 99,99
25 Rubber 304396 304396 0,01 100
328022175 669361877 1458745840 1897892006 4354021898 100
Source: "Report on the operation of STABEX", Commision of the European Communities, Brussels, various issues.
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 1.72% over 1975-1998, which is even less than the values, 2.33% and 2.69% determined for the periods 1975-1987
(Hermmann, Burger and Smit, 1993) and 1973-1993 (Aiello, 1999a), respectively.
If on one hand the aggregate and average effects of Stabex are weak, on the other hand there is a large cross-
country variation in the results. Indeed, STABEX is effective in 39 out of 52 cases and the highest (5,82%) and the
lowest (0,42%) stabilizing effects occur for Vanuatu and Congo, respectively. On the other hand, in 13 countries
Stabex payments determine an increase of the national export earnings instability and the highest destabilizing
impact occurs for Grenada (5,7%) (Table 6).
Some other general results emerging from the analysis reflect the fact that a group of small isles (St Lucia, St.
Vincent, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Jamaica, Fiji) registers a substantial reduction of their national export earnings due
to Stabex compensations. If we compare these findings with the ones obtained in Aiello (1999a), where it was
shown that the impact of STABEX on the EEI of these countries was weak over 1975-1993, then it will be possible
to conclude that the scheme has become more effective more recently. One policy implication of this argument is
that, when it is jointly considered with the low amount of payments received by these states and with their strong
dependence on primary exports, it emphases the key role of the scheme for the sustainability of their economic
growth and support their position in the current international talks about the maintenance and the giving
strengthening of Stabex.
Besides the analysis of the impact on the variability of export earnings, an overall evaluation of Stabex requires
further investigation to verify if it has really stimulated ACP economic growth. Indeed, it is especially difficult to
claim the full efficiency of the compensation scheme if we look at the effect of stabilisation export earnings on its
own. This is because a stabilizing effect on export time series over a number of years does not necessarily lead to a
stabilisation in the income of producers operating in the sector and thus does not necessarily stimulate an increase in
the overall level of efficiency in the country concerned. Therefore, following the procedure used in Aiello (1999b),
the link between Stabex stabilizing effect and ACP growth has been tested by re-estimating the equation of real
GDP per capita and productivity growth in which the following two variables have been added:
- D is a dummy variable, which is equal  to one for those ACPs, whose export earnings instability has been
reduced as a result of Stabex and to zero for those ACPs which experienced an increase of exports variability;
- ST is the log of the value of payments (as percentage of GDP) received by each ACP state.
In the case of the dummy variable D, one would expect that, ceteris paribus, the impact of Stabex on the growth of
ACPs would be greater (lesser) for those states that have experienced a reduction (increase) of their export
earnings instability. However, the dummy variable D is expected to be associated with (to have) a positive
coefficient. Similar arguments hold for the variable ST: all things being equal, the greater the amount of
compensation, the better is the economic performance of the country  concerned.
Table 7 shows the results obtained when D and ST are added in the list of explanatory variables in the equations of
growth. The first result is that the sign and the statistical significance of the coefficients associated with the
variables other than D and ST are similar to those shown in tables 1 and 2. This suggests that the regressors D and
ST do not introduce multicollinearity into the models. More interestingly for the specific purposes of regressions, the
estimates show how the Stabex stabilizing effect does not exert any effect on ACPs global economic growth,
because of the very low level of significance registered by the coefficient of the dummy D. Same outcome emerges
by the regression of productivity growth. The picture is no better when the exercise is repeated using the variable
ST, whose coefficients are close to zero and not significant.  Therefore, this analysis provides new empirical
evidence to support the view that Stabex has not been very effective, where effectiveness is taken to mean the
capacity of the scheme to promote, in same way, the economic growth of ACPs.
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Table 6
Stabex impact on ACPs’ Export Earnings Instability (1975-1998)
Instability
without
STABEX
Instability
with
STABEX
Stabilizing
Effect
Instability
without
STABEX
Instability
with
STABEX
Stabilizing
Effect
Countries (1) (2) [(2-
1)/1]*100
Countries (1) (2) [(2-1)/1]*100
Belize 102,4 100,7 -1,66 Malawi 32,1 31,2 -2,80
Benin 87,3 85,7 -1,83 Mali 19,2 18,7 -2,60
Burkina Faso 34,9 34,2 -2,01 Mauritania 34,5 35,3 2,32
Burundi 14,1 13,8 -2,13 Mauritius 25,3 25,8 1,98
Cameroon 29,1 27,9 -4,12 Mozambique 27,8 28,01 0,76
Cape Verde 25,1 24,5 -2,39 Niger 42,1 43,3 2,85
Chad 43,9 43,3 -1,37 P.N. Guinea 14,6 13,9 -4,79
Comoros 21,5 21,01 -2,28 CAR 53,1 52,4 -1,32
Congo 47,1 46,9 -0,42 Rwanda 38,9 37,8 -2,83
Ivory Coast 24,9 23,5 -5,62 West. Samoa 33,2 34,1 2,71
Dominica 49,1 47,86 -2,53 St. Vincent 29,4 27,1 -7,82
Ethiopia 21,4 20,8 -2,80 St Lucia 39,1 37,3 -4,60
Fiji 27,2 26,03 -4,30 Saò Tomé & P. 24,2 23,9 -1,24
Gabon 29,9 28,6 -4,35 Senegal 28,3 27,2 -3,89
Gambia 23,6 23 -2,54 Sierra Leone 12,3 12,03 -2,20
Ghana 18,7 16 -14,44 Somalia 42,2 40,8 -3,32
Jamaica 26,1 25 -4,21 Sudan 25,4 26,3 3,54
Djibouti 34,1 34,5 1,17 Swaziland 31,9 33,1 3,76
Grenada 19,3 20,4 5,70 Tanzania 43,2 44,3 2,55
Guinea Bissau 22,4 22,62 0,98 Togo 54,3 51,6 -4,97
Guinea Equatorial 27,4 27 -1,46 Tonga 27,4 26,1 -4,74
Is. Solomon 27,1 26,8 -1,11 Tuvalu 89,1 87,5 -1,80
Kenya 15,1 15,8 4,64 Uganda 23,6 23,3 -1,27
Kiribati 26,4 26,01 -1,48 Vanuatu 44,7 42,1 -5,82
Lesotho 40,1 41,2 2,74 Zimbabwe 42,1 41,8 -0,71
Madagascar 45,6 43,9 -3,73 Haiti 65,7 64,1 -2,44
All ACPs 29,1 28,7 -1,37
Arithmetic mean 35,14 34,54 -1,72
Median 29,25 27,95
Stand. Dev. 18,35 18,04
Source: own computations on data from FAO “Agristat Database” and EU Commission publications.
Table 7  STABEX and growth of ACP (1975-1998)
Variables
Economic
Growth
Economic
Growth
TFP
Growth
TFP
Growth
Constant 10.7
(2.35)
9.8
(2.02)
23.1
(2.11)
20.7
(2.02)
Log (Initial per capita income) -0.019
(-2.4)
-0.018
(-2.33)
-0.0132
(-1.95)
-0.013
(-1.9)
Schooling 0.018 0.0183 0.0142 0.0142
(2.46) (2.21) (2.046) (1.96)
Investments to GDP 0.021
(1.56)
0.02
(1.66)
0.017
(1.19)
0.017
(1.32)
Budget Deficit/GDP -1.61
(1.77)
-1.63
(1.87)
-0.93
(1.97)
-0.967
(1.92)
Log (1+Black Market Premium) -0.202
(2.13)
-0.205
(1.97)
-0.17
(1.98)
-0.165
(1.99)
[(Exports + Imports)/GDP] 0.78
(2.09)
0.72
(2.11)
0.528
(1.927)
0.51
(1.91)
Term of Trade 0.13
(2.21)
0.12
(2.01)
0.106
(1.99)
0.104
(1.98)
Index of EEI -0.335
(2.32)
-0.33
(2.31)
-0.38
(2.21)
-0.37
(2.21)
Dummy D 0.012
(1.12)
0.016
(1.22)
ST 0.032
(0.98)
0.021
(1.04)
R2 adj 0.435 0.42 0.38 0.365
Obs.
LM test
52
3.21
52
3.12
52
3,45
52
3.22
Source: see table 1.
t-values are corrected for heteroscedasticity by White’s (1980) method
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5. Why Stabex failed.
The previous section described Stabex’s lack of success in stabilising the export receipts of ACPs and how the
scheme has failed to have a positive effect on their economic growth. These results become even more apparent
when an attempt is made to determine the impact of the scheme on the growth of total factor productivity,
which, in turn, is an important source of growth.
This section will try to find some of the reasons which may have contributed to this and examine certain of the
functional mechanisms of the compensation scheme. The aim of this final part of the work is not just to provide
elements for evaluation in order to account for what has happened in the past, but also to reflect on the possible
political and economic implications which can derive from a study of the workings of the scheme. This rests on
the assumption that the current negotiations between the EU and the ACP will culminate in the signing of a new
Lomé Convention.
As specified in section 3 the instrumental objective of the scheme is to guarantee the stability of foreign currency
earnings in the triggering sectors, which are relevant to the export structure of each country.  For this reason it
appears important to devote more detailed attention to micro-biased specifics of STABEX, which are crucial for
its correct functioning. In particular, the aspects which are considered here are the composition of the basket of
goods which benefit from transfers and the use of the transfers in the specific sector for which they had been
claimed.
Ceteris paribus, one would expect that the greater the number of products covered by the scheme the greater
the observable effect at the level of total exports and, therefore, the stronger the impact on growth in the
economy of the beneficiaries. On the other hand, the logic underlying the aim of stabilizing earnings from exports
of each product requires that compensations are transferred immediately to the sector concerned in order to
allow producers both to reorganize production and improve their investment planning (see section 3).
One of the most controversial and debated aspects of STABEX is its product  coverage. The list of eligible
products has been extended over time from 29 in Lomè I to 49 in Lomè IV. The aim of the EU-ACP agreement
is to provide financial support to the exports of traditional commodities, in particular tropical tree crops, upon
which many ACPs, as exporters, and the EU countries, as importers, depend. In fact, the STABEX-products still
represent a large proportion of the total exports of many ACPs which are the predominant suppliers to the EU
market.  It would appear, however, that this basket of products could put ACP countries at a disadvantage. In
fact, it could be a disincentive to diversification: it is in the interest of ACPs to achieve certain levels of
production and exports in the selected sectors to satisfy the qualifying criteria of STABEX and then claim
compensation. Yet it is unclear what the economic justification is for excluding various products (sugar, meat and
tobacco) from the stabilisation scheme  which are crucial for many countries (Zimbabwe, Malawi, Mauritius,
Guyana, Fiji, Jamaica, Swaziland, Botswana). This choice can certainly not be justified on the grounds that
certain products (meat and sugar) are included in preferential commercial agreements because the preferential
policies are not concerned with export instability and, even if this were not the case, it would be impossible to
understand the inclusion of bananas to which Lomé granted a specific protocol. The paradox surrounding the
exclusion of these products can be highlighted by recalling the guiding principle for the formation of the STABEX
basket of goods, which was «to take account of employment, of the deterioration of the terms of trade between
the EU and ACPs, on the level of development in the latter as well as the difficulties of isolation faced by  less
developed ACP states» (Art. 17, Lomè I). Evidently, political reasons concerning the protection of the EU
domestic producer have outweighed the economic factors which should have inspired the choice of products to
be included in the scheme. Today for various reasons the protection arguments inside the Community have lost
ground and this fact may make it now politically feasible to extend the range of goods under STABEX.
As regards the eligible products, there is another element to be considered, which has often been misinterpreted.
Why does STABEX take into consideration only primary materials from the agricultural sector but totally reject
mineral commodities? Compensation payments are made in order to «overcome one of the main obstacles to the
stability, profitability and sustained growth of the economies of ACPs … through stabilising the export
earnings of products on which their economies are dependent and which are affected by fluctuation in price or
quantity or both these factors» (Art. 186.1, Lomé IV). This implies that the causes of instability are completely
disregarded: the only thing that is considered is the stabilisation of export earnings. Therefore, it is hard to defend
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the selection of only agricultural products simply by saying that their export earnings instability depends to a
greater extent on factors linked to domestic conditions of production, whereas in the case of the mining products
the causes of variability are linked to fluctuations on the demand side20.  One consequence of the fact that the
basket of goods covered by the system is tilted in favor of certain tropical agricultural products is the way
STABEX payments are distributed on a country and/or product level (see tables 4 and 5). As it functions at the
moment it is of doubtful utility to privilege the biggest and the richest ACPs and doubts increase when one
considers that from Lomé IV the STABEX payments are grants. Moreover the inclusion of only certain products
accentuates the asymmetry in the treatment of ACPs under the Lomé Convention, because no account is taken
of the position of some of the poorest countries (i.e., Zaire, Sierra Leone, Zambia, Zimbabwe) which export
mineral products (copper, rutile, bauxite, phosphates). Nevertheless, there is no mention in any official publication
of the Commission of the difficulties connected with the setting up of a compensation system including all
products, which would lead to reduction in those disparities in treatment between and within ACPs that have
been evident up to the present. The new scheme should take into account these arguments in order to give
security to all countries against the harmful effects of external shocks occurred in every sector which makes up
a substantial part of national export earnings.
Another characteristic of STABEX that requires discussion is the utilisation of transfers in the beneficiary
countries. The extreme flexibility in allocating compensations (see note 18) has been  accompanied by a large
measure of discretion in the management of the funds by ACP governments. It is reasonable to consider that
from the point of view of individual ACPs the lack of constraints in the regulations did not represent a problem,
since, given the currency shortages, the balance of payments and debt problems, the object of governments is to
increase the intake of foreign currency, whatever the source. Operating in this way, however, the donors can be
considered equally responsible for the process which generates an incorrect perception of the variability in export
earnings in that each ACP links the wide variation in revenues from exports, with the transfers which result from
it. In other words, the ACPs see STABEX as an additional aid window, not as a stabilisation device. It is quite
clear that this works as a disincentive to imposing policies aimed at removing the domestic causes of instability
and this must be very ought to be  taken into account in future Lomé negotiations.
Furthermore, these arguments could be used to explain the low impact of STABEX on economic growth in
ACPs, because the possibility of diverting funds into sectors other than those which experienced a drop in
revenue introduces further distorting elements in the economy. This is why the agents who operate directly with
foreign markets not only observe no stabilisation of their incomes, but when the sector targeting of compensation
is not fully effective21, they are also jeopardised by an increase of the relative price of non tradable goods22.
On the contrary, had ACP governments been obliged to utilise the funds in the triggering sectors, then it would
have been possible to set up a virtuous circle which starting from the stabilisation of revenues of producers
would have facilitated the rationalisation of decision making at the micro level and as a result would have enabled
the country to achieve in the long run higher economic growth rates. Through the framework of mutual
obligations, Lomé IV has seriously attempted to direct transfers into the triggering sectors, surely improving
allocation compared to preceding conventions. On the other hand the procedures for signing obligations are too
rigid, cumbersome and time consuming and this has deprived farmers of any stabilising effect on their income.
                                                                
20 It should be recalled that in 1980  the EU introduced a scheme, SYSMIN, that was aimed at the production of certain
mineral products (copper, phosphates, manganese, bauxite, aluminum and tin).  The substantial difference with STABEX
is that SYSMIN payments are used to compensate for losses of production capacity in the ACPs.
21The use of transfers outside the triggering sectors constitutes the rule rather than the exception followed by ACP
governments in the management of STABEX funds (ERO, 1995, Hewitt A., 1983, 1993; Kappel, 1996; Lim D., 1991)
22 For a more detailed discussion on this point see Collier et al. (1999) and CERDI et al. (1998).
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